Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation. by Nishi, Akihiro et al.
UCLA
UCLA Previously Published Works
Title


















eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
1Scientific RepoRts | 6:29622 | DOI: 10.1038/srep29622
www.nature.com/scientificreports
Social Environment Shapes the 
Speed of Cooperation
Akihiro Nishi1,2,3, Nicholas A. Christakis2,3,4,5, Anthony M. Evans6, A. James O’Malley7,8 & 
David G. Rand2,9,10
Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? 
While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused 
on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important real-world 
social interactions. In repeated interactions, the cooperativeness of one’s interaction partners (the 
“social environment”) should affect the speed of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that reciprocal 
decisions (choices that mirror behavior observed in the social environment), rather than cooperative 
decisions per se, occur more quickly. We test this hypothesis by examining four independent decision 
time datasets with a total of 2,088 subjects making 55,968 decisions. We show that reciprocal decisions 
are consistently faster than non-reciprocal decisions: cooperation is faster than defection in cooperative 
environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative environments. These 
differences are further enhanced by subjects’ previous behavior – reciprocal decisions are faster when 
they are consistent with the subject’s previous choices. Finally, mediation analyses of a fifth dataset 
suggest that the speed of reciprocal decisions is explained, in part, by feelings of conflict – reciprocal 
decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and less decision conflict appears to lead to 
shorter decision times.
Understanding the evolution of cooperation has been a major focus of research for decades1–13. Exploring the 
proximate cognitive mechanisms underlying this extraordinary cooperation helps to shed light on the evolu-
tionary forces that gave rise to it14–19. In recent years, an emerging body of work has sought to illuminate the 
cognitive processes involved in cooperation by examining the speed at which humans make cooperative versus 
non-cooperative decisions20–32.
This work focused primarily, however, on one-shot games, asking if cooperative decisions are faster (or slower) 
than defection decisions. These studies have produced inconsistent results: although many find that cooperation 
is faster than defection21,22,24,27–29, others report the opposite pattern20,23,26. (Importantly, here we are referring to 
work examining correlations between decision speed and cooperation, rather than experimental manipulations 
of decision speed (or cognitive processing more generally) where the results are much more consistent: a recent 
meta-analysis of 51 manipulation studies with over 17,000 total participants shows that experimentally inducing 
intuitive decision-making has a clear positive effect on cooperation in 1-shot games33).
Despite prior work’s focus on one-shot games, life outside the laboratory is typified by repeated interactions 
over time, where there is a self-interested motivation to cooperate6,8,9,34. Thus, repeated interactions involve a 
conflict between the short-term gains from choosing defection and the long-term gains achieved through mutual 
cooperation6,35. Given the centrality of repeated interactions to social life, extending research on decision time 
correlations to repeated games may help to reconcile prior contradictory findings from one-shot games and fur-
ther clarify the relationship between decision time and cooperation.
In the more ecologically valid context of repeated interactions, we propose that reciprocity, rather than cooper-
ation or defection per se, occurs quickly. In repeated interactions, people are strongly influenced by the previous 
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behavior of their interaction partners36–39. The norm of reciprocity is universal in human societies40 and it is an 
adaptive strategy in repeated interaction9,41. Critically, the hypothesis that reciprocity occurs quickly suggests that 
the social environment shapes the speed of cooperation. Hence, when people interact in a cooperative environ-
ment, their cooperation should be faster than defection. However, the opposite pattern should emerge when peo-
ple interact in a non-cooperative environment – their defection should be faster than cooperation. The present 
study tests these predictions.
Furthermore, we shed light on precisely what the cognitive implications of decision time correlations are. 
Most prior work takes a dual process perspective, assuming that faster decisions are related to the use of auto-
matic, intuitive process, whereas slower decisions are driven by deliberative, rational processes42–45. However, 
recent work30,46 has made the controversial argument that cooperative decision times are instead largely driven 
by decision conflict47–49. Under this interpretation, fast decisions occur when people strongly prefer one response, 
and decisions are slow when people find competing responses equally appealing. In the present work, we take 
advantage of the reciprocity perspective to provide additional evidence for the decision conflict theory of decision 
times.
Materials and Methods
Data Summary. To explore the role of social environment in shaping the relationship between decision 
times and reciprocity, we examine data from four independent studies in which subjects play repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games (PD, Studies 1 and 3) or repeated Public Goods Games (PGG, Studies 2 and 4)38,50–52 (Table 1). 
These data represent all of the repeated game experiments previously conducted by our group in which decision 
times were recorded. In all four studies, subjects make a series of choices about whether to pay a cost in order to 
benefit one or more interaction partners. After each choice, subjects are informed about the choices of all their 
interaction partners. This means that after the first round of each game, subjects are aware of the social environ-
ment in which their interactions are occurring. In total, we analyze the data of four studies, 108 different sessions, 
2,088 human subjects, and 55,968 cooperation decisions (nested in this order). Studies 1 through 3 and Study 5 
were approved by the Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects, and Study 4 was approved 
by the Yale University Human Subjects Committee. All methods were carried out in accordance with the relevant 
guidelines.
Inclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria for datasets in our analysis of repeated games are 1) the game struc-
ture is PD or PGG; 2) repeated interactions are observed (since decision time reflecting others’ previous moves 
is not examined in one-shot games); and 3) the defined decision time is adequately recorded (please see the defi-
nition below). Among studies fitting the first and the second condition, we excluded several potential sources of 
data53–56, because they did not meet the 3rd condition. We thus obtained data of four independent studies imple-
mented from 2007 to 2013 (Studies 1 to 4)38,50–52, which were briefly summarized in Table 1.
Study 1. Dreber et al.50 recruited 104 Boston-area university students in the US, and investigated the effect 
of adding a costly punishment option into the typical two options (C or D) in the repeated PD on cooperation. 
The experiments took place at Harvard Business School Computer Lab for Experimental Research (HBS CLER). 
The recruited individuals joined one of a total of four sessions between April and May 2007, in which they were 
randomly assigned to a treatment session (a costly punishment option was added, i.e., C, D, or Punish, N = 54) 
or a control session (that option was not added; C or D only, N = 50). Since the costly punishment option was not 
the research focus of the present study, we used the data from the two control sessions. The subjects repeatedly 
interacted with a same individual in a PD up to 95 rounds via computer. Since interaction partners were shuffled 
several times during a single session, there were intermediate rounds without the cooperation history of inter-
action partners newly connected, which we omitted from the analysis. The contribution to the opponent was 
dichotomous: C or D. In the two control sessions, two different payoff matrices were applied (benefit-cost ratio 








rounds Contribution Research topic




PD 50 2 2,770 95 C/D** Costly punishment




PGG 192 8 9,600 50 0–20* Reward and punishment




PD 384 18 30,038 139 C/D Noise in behaviors
4 Nishi et al.52 Amazon Mturk workers PGG 1,462 80 13,560 10 C/D Endowment inequality
Table 1. Characteristics of the four independent studies used. DSL, Decision Science Laboratory; HBS 
CLER, Harvard Business School Computer Lab for Experimental Research; Mturk, Mechanical Turk; PGG, 
Public goods game; PD, Prisoner’s dilemma game; C, Cooperation; D, Defection. * 10 or more is categorized as 
C, and less than 10 is categorized as D for the main analysis. * * The treatment group (n = 54) allowed subjects 
to have a third choice (punishment) in addition to C/D, and so we restricted our analysis to the control group 
(n = 50).
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[b/c] = 2 or b/c = 3). In total, we obtained 2,770 decision-making events in the conventional repeated PD with 
decision time.
Study 2. Rand et al.51 recruited 192 subjects among Boston-area university students in the US, and inves-
tigated the role of an additional stage of reward and punishment after the stage of a typical PGG with repeated 
interactions. The experiments also took place at HBS CLER. The recruited individuals joined one of a total of 8 
sessions between February and March 2009, in which the rules governing the additional stage was manipulated 
(stage 1 for the PGG, and stage 2 for punishment and reward to interaction partners): no additional stage, an 
additional stage of punishment, that of reward, or that of reward/punishment. They repeatedly interacted with 
the same individuals in a group of four subjects in a PGG up to 50 rounds via computer. Here the effective b/c 
was 2. Since the contribution to opponents was a continuous variable (contribute 0–20 monetary units), we cre-
ated a dichotomous variable of C (contribution is 10 or more) or D (contribution is less than 10). Using another 
threshold for classifying cooperation v.s. defection (C for 20 and D for less than 20) does not substantially change 
the results (Table S8). In total, we obtained 9,600 decision-making events in the conventional repeated PD with 
decision time.
Study 3. Fudenberg et al.38 recruited 384 Boston-area university students in the US, and investigated the 
evolution of cooperation when intended cooperative decision-making was implemented with noise added to the 
typical repeated PD. The experiments took place at Harvard University Decision Science Laboratory (DSL). The 
recruited individuals joined one of a total of 18 sessions between September 2009 and October 2010, in which 
the b/c ratio (four options: 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, or 4) and the error probability (three options) were manipulated. Subjects 
repeatedly interacted with a same individual in a PD up to 139 rounds via computer. Since interaction partners 
were shuffled several times during a single session, there were intermediate rounds without the cooperation his-
tory of interaction partners newly connected, which we omitted from the analysis. The contribution to the oppo-
nent was dichotomous: C or D. Due to the nature of the study, the actual decisions were not necessarily identical 
to the intended decisions. Since focal individuals could refer to the actual decision of the opponent at the last 
round, and decided on their intended decisions, we used the information of actual decisions for the type of social 
environment, and the intended decisions for the focal individuals’ decision-makings. In total, we obtained 30,038 
decision-making events in the conventional repeated PD with decision time.
Study 4. Nishi et al.52 recruited 1,462 subjects through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk)57 from all over the 
world, and investigated the effect of endowment inequality and the information availability of network neigh-
bors’ score (i.e., wealth) on the dynamics of cooperation and other outcomes. The recruited subjects joined one 
of a total of 80 online sessions between October and December 2013 and repeatedly interacted with connecting 
neighbors in a PGG up to 10 rounds via computer. The contribution to the public good (investment toward all the 
connecting neighbors) was dichotomous: “cooperate (C)” with all of them or “defect (D)” against all of a subject’s 
connections. The benefit-cost ratio (b/c) was 2. In total, we obtained 13,560 decision-making events in the PGG 
with decision time.
Decision time. The main outcome variable in our analysis was decision time (the distribution is shown in 
Fig. S1). Decision time has commonly been used in basic and applied psychology58,59, and has been more com-
monly used in broader disciplines of social science in relation to neuroscience22,60–63. Decision time was previ-
ously defined as “the number of seconds between the moment that our server receives the request for a problem 
until the moment that an answer is returned to the server”60. Here, to fit the definition with our setting, we 
redefined decision time as the time between when a step in which each subject was asked to choose cooperate or 
defect appeared on the screen and when each subject clicked Cooperate or Defect on the screen, for example, in 
Study 4 (Fig. S3). Also, as indicated in prior literature60, the subjects were not informed that decision time was 
recorded in any of the four studies.
Analytic procedure. Since the data regarding the decision-making events (Studies 1 to 4) were observed 
multiple times in a single subject, in a single session, and in a single study, we took into account the hierarchi-
cal data structure by using multilevel analysis with a random intercepts model (restricted maximum likelihood 
[REML])64, in the following statistical analyses for each study and for the combined data of the four studies (three 
levels for the study-specific analysis and four levels for the joint analysis; P values reported below are based on 
these models). For the outcome variable of the multilevel analysis, we log10-transformed the decision time (sec-
onds), because the distribution of decision times was heavily right-skewed (the same transformation was used in 
prior work22,63).
We classified the decision-making of a focal individual in a given round into cooperative decisions (choosing 
to cooperate) and defection decisions (choosing to defect). Because baseline decision times varied considerably 
across experiments, we took the percent change in decision time of cooperation relative to defection (i.e. 100 × 
([average decision time of cooperation] − [average decision time of defection])/[average decision time of defec-
tion]), rather than the absolute difference in decision times. We then examined the effect of social environment 
by comparing this difference in decision times for subjects who were in a cooperative versus non-cooperative 
social environment.
For the data at the 1st round (“unknown environment”), in each of the two categories (cooperation deci-
sions or defection decisions), the relative difference of decision time was calculated (through exponentiation of 
the point estimates), and a P value for comparison between cooperation and defection decisions was calculated 
(N = 2,068 decisions) (Fig. 1, left). In the unknown environment, subjects make their choices without informa-
tion regarding the previous behavior of their interaction partners (as is the case in previous work examining 
decision times in one-shot games).
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For the data regarding the second round or later (N = 53,900 decisions), we classified the decision-making 
of interaction partner(s) at a previous round (i.e., type of social environment) into a cooperative environment 
(defined as cooperation rate of connecting neighbors at the previous move ≥ 0.5 or more) and a non-cooperative 
environment (the rate < 0.5) (sensitivity analyses using different thresholds did not substantially change the 
results) (Table S7). Note that, since the people to whom each subject connects is unique to each subject, the type 
of social environment (i.e. peers) varies at the subject level. We added a continuous variable of round number 
as a covariate for the multilevel analyses, since the decision time naturally decreases over the rounds (omitting 
round as a covariate does not substantially change the results). At each of the two-by-two categories (coopera-
tion or defection decisions × cooperation or non-cooperative environments), the relative difference of decision 
time was calculated, and a P value for comparison between cooperation decisions and defection decisions was 
calculated (Fig. 1, middle and right). Also, in order to jointly investigate the difference of decision time between 
two decisions specific to an environment (cooperative or non-cooperative), we created an interaction term of the 
“decision” and “environment,” and calculated the P value of the term (Table S4). Moreover, we stratified the data 
after the second round by the cooperation decision at the previous round ([t −  1]th round) and at the previous and 
first rounds (Figs 2 and S2).
We also performed another sensitivity analysis to examine the potential influence of variation in the b/c ratio 
(range: 1.5 to 4, but mostly 2), as b/c ratio has been shown to influence the speed of cooperation46. To show that 
our main results are not artifacts of variation in b/c, we demonstrate qualitatively similar results when restricting 
the data to only those conditions with a b/c ratio of 2 (i.e. excluding conditions from Studies 1 and 3 with b/c ≠ 2) 
(Table S10).
For the results in the figures, the coefficients calculated with the log10-transformed decision time were expo-
nentiated back to report the percent change in decision time from defection decisions to cooperation decisions 
(we report only percent changes – i.e., ratio measures, which are robust to the “retransformation problem”65 
affecting absolute values and differences, when assuming a homogenous variance).
Additional analysis with Study 5. Finally, to shed light on the psychological processes underlying the 
speed of reciprocal decisions, we re-analyze reciprocity behavior in a one-shot asynchronous trust game. In Study 
5, Evans et al.30 recruited 235 American subjects through Mturk, and investigated feelings of conflict and decision 
times for second movers in the trust game66. In the trust game, Player 1 (P1) can send 0, 10, 20, 30, or 40 cents to 
Player 2 (P2); any money sent is tripled by the experimenter; and then P2 decides how much of the tripled money 
(if any) to return to P1. The strategy selection method was used, meaning that P2 made a separate decision for 
each possible choice of P1. Before each decision, subjects were asked to rate how conflicted they felt, and P2’s 
responses to P1’s four non-zero decisions were presented in a random order.
Figure 1. Cooperation is faster than defection in an unknown social environment and in a cooperative 
social environment, while defection is faster in a non-cooperative social environment across four studies 
of repeated economic games and in the combined data. The percent change in decision time for cooperation 
as compared with that for defection is calculated by regression analysis using random intercepts models that 
account for the hierarchical data structure (studies, sessions, individuals, and decisions). Left, the results in 
the 1st round, in which subjects are in an unknown social environment and do not know if neighbors are 
cooperative or not, are shown. Middle, the results of cooperative social environments in later rounds (≥ 2) are 
shown. Right, the results of non-cooperative social environments in later rounds (≥ 2) are shown. A cooperative 
social environment is defined as cooperation rate of interaction partners at the last round of 0.5 or more, while 
a non-cooperative social environment is defined as that of less than 0.5. Error bars, point estimate ± standard 
error. n.s. for P ≥ 0.05, * for P < 0.05, * * for P < 0.01, and * * * for P < 0.001.
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Prior work shows that the more P1 sends, the stronger P2’s desire to return money67. Thus, in this one-shot 
game, the level of trust that P1 shows towards P2 forms P2’s social environment (more trust by P1 creates a more 
cooperative social environment for P2). This social environment is exogenously drawn from the P2 perspec-
tive. Inspired by recent theories of decision conflict as the driver of decision times in social dilemmas25,30,46, we 
hypothesize that in cooperative social environments, cooperative subjects will feel less conflicted, and thus decide 
more quickly, than non-cooperative subjects. In non-cooperative environments, conversely, we hypothesize that 
the opposite will be true. Moreover, we hypothesize that decision conflict will mediate the relationship between 
social environment and cooperation when predicting decision times. To test this hypothesis, we examine subjects’ 
responses to the question, “How conflicted do you feel about your decision?”, measured on the screen immediately 
prior to the final decision screen30.
Here, we estimated a multilevel model of moderated mediation where the interactive effects of social envi-
ronment (initial trust) and P2 choice (amount returned to the first mover) on decision time were mediated by 
feelings of conflict (Fig. S4). Social environment and P2 choice were scaled to range from − 0.5 to + 0.5. Feelings 
of conflict were made on a scale from 1 to 10 and were z-transformed. The coefficients were estimated by gener-
alized structural equation model estimation68.
Data accessibility. The data reported in this paper are archived at Yale Institute for Network Science Data 
Archive and are available upon request.
Results
Our results show that when subjects are deciding in the unknown environment, there is a negative relationship 
between decision time and cooperation across the four studies (Fig. 1, left). All four studies exhibit a significant 
relationship (P = 0.007, 0.006, < 0.001, and 0.014), and the combined data of the four also exhibit a significant 
relationship: cooperation decisions are 12.5% quicker than defection decisions (P < 0.001). Our analyses using 
the first-round data from studies with repeated interactions thus generally replicate the findings of prior studies 
investigating decision time in one-shot economic cooperation games21,22,24,27–29. All the analytic results are shown 
in Tables S1–S9.
For decisions beginning with the second round or later, our results show that social environment strongly 
moderates the relationship between decision time and cooperation: there is a significant interaction between 
social environment and decision (cooperate or defect) when predicting decision time in each of the four studies 
and in the combined data of the four studies (all interaction Ps < 0.001) (Table S4). To understand this interac-
tion, we test the relationship between cooperation and decision time within the cooperative and non-cooperative 
social environments separately.
Figure 2. Speed of cooperation as compared with defection in cooperative environments is more 
clearly seen when subjects cooperate in the previous round, and speed of defection in non-cooperative 
environments is more clearly seen when subjects defect in the previous round. Using the combined data 
of the four studies, the percent change in decision time for cooperation as compared with that for defection at 
the present round is calculated by random intercepts model in the four categories: cooperators in the previous 
round facing cooperative social environments (left, blue), defectors in the previous round facing cooperative 
social environments (left, red), cooperators in the previous round facing non-cooperative social environments 
(right, blue), and defectors in the previous round facing non-cooperative social environments (right, red). Both 
the result of hypothesis testing for each bar (away from 0) and that for the comparison between two bars by an 
interaction term are shown. P values for the interaction term indicate the effect differs significantly between 
previous cooperators and defectors. Error bars, point estimates ± standard errors. n.s. for P ≥ 0.05, * for 
P < 0.05, * * for P < 0.01, and * * * for P < 0.001.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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When subjects are deciding in the context of a cooperative environment, there is a negative relationship 
between decision time and cooperation: cooperation decisions are significantly faster than defection decisions in 
three of the four studies (P = 0.003, 0.615, <0.001, and 0.001) (Fig. 1, middle). The combined data exhibit a signif-
icant relationship: cooperation decisions are 6.0% quicker than defection decisions overall (P < 0.001). The level 
of speed is similar to the results in the unknown environment (i.e., cooperation is 12.5% faster in an unknown 
environment at the 1st round v.s. 6.0% faster in a cooperative environment at later rounds, adjusting for the round 
effect) (P = 0.957) (Table S9). This similarity suggests that, in an unknown environment, people are typically 
assuming that others will be cooperative.
Conversely, when subjects are deciding in the context of a non-cooperative environment, cooperation decisions 
are significantly slower than defection decisions in three of the four studies (P < 0.001, <0.001, 0.370, <0.001) 
(Fig. 1, right). The combined data also exhibit a significant relationship: cooperation decisions are 4.4% slower 
than defection decisions (P < 0.001). In sum, in both social environments, reciprocal decisions that mirrored the 
previous choices of interaction partners are faster than non-reciprocal decisions.
Furthermore, we investigate the interaction between the individual and their social environment. First, we ask 
how the subject’s own decision in the previous round influences decision times. In a cooperative environment, the 
subject’s previous behavior influences the speed of cooperation and defection decisions (interaction P = 0.003) 
(Fig. 2, left): previous cooperators are faster to choose cooperation than defection (9.0% difference, P < 0.001), 
whereas cooperation and defection are comparably fast for previous defectors (1.5% difference, P = 0.361). 
Previous behavior also influences the speed of cooperation and defection decisions in a non-cooperative environ-
ment (interaction P < 0.001) (Fig. 2, right): previous defectors are much faster to choose defection than coopera-
tion (17.2% difference, P < 0.001). Previous cooperators are also faster to select defection than cooperation (3.5% 
difference, P = 0.016), though this effect was smaller than the effect for previous defectors.
We also replicate these results when using an individual’s cooperation decision in the very first round of the 
session, which is not influenced by the behavior of other players, and therefore can be viewed as a more pure 
proxy for subjects’ predisposition to cooperate (i.e. the extent to which they express the “cooperative pheno-
type”69). The role of first-round cooperation is minor after the stratification by the subject’s previous behavior 
as shown above. However, in a non-cooperative environment, cooperation decisions require more time among 
subjects who initially choose to cooperate but later choose to defect (“learned defectors”) compared to subjects 
who initially and previously choose to defect (“consistent defectors”) (interaction P = 0.010) (Fig. S2).
Regarding the additional analysis of Study 5, we find that, when there is a mismatch between the P2’s social 
environment and P2’s decision (bottom-right and upper-left in Fig. 3a), P2 feels a higher level of conflict. 
Moreover, a higher level of conflict is associated with longer decision times (Fig. 3b). The structural equation 
model analyses support these findings: P2’s social environment (P1’s level of trust) and P2’s decision (amount 
P2 returns to P1) interact to determine feelings of conflict (P < 0.001) and decision times (P < 0.001) (Fig. S4). 
Importantly, feelings of conflict significantly mediate the interactive effects of social environment and P2’s deci-
sion on decision times (P = 0.001). As predicted, reciprocal choices (sending back large amounts of money after 
initial acts of trust) are less conflicted, and therefore, faster than non-reciprocal choices.
Discussion
Here we have shown that in repeated interactions, reciprocal decisions occur more quickly: cooperation is faster 
than defection in cooperative social environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative 
Figure 3. The mismatch between the social environment and decision relates to feelings of conflict (a), 
which can predict decision time (b) (Study 5). (a) Trust/cooperation in social environment (for Player 2) is 
proportional to the amount of money sent from Player 1 to Player 2. Both the measures of trust/cooperation 
in social environment (x-axis) and money sent back from Player 2 to Player 1 (y-axis) are standardized (range, 
− 0.5 to 0.5). A higher value in both the measures represents a higher level of trust/cooperation to the opponent. 
Feeling of conflict (of Player 2) is the level of conflict when Player 2 decides the level of money sent back to 
Player 1 (y-axis) facing a certain level of trust in social environment (x-axis). A higher value in feeling of conflict 
represents a higher level of conflict. (b) Log10-transformed decision time (of Player 2) is the decision time 
when Player 2 decides the level of money sent back to Player 1. Mismatch between decision and environment 
is calculated by the absolute value of the difference between Level of trust in social environment and Level of 
money sent back (decision). The fitted line by simple linear regression is displayed to show the tendency.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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environments. Therefore, it is not the case that cooperation is uniformly faster than defection, or vice versa. 
Interestingly, when subjects lack direct knowledge of their interaction partners (e.g., in an unknown environ-
ment), decision times are similar to those in the cooperative environment – cooperation is faster than defection. 
These findings are robustly observed in different repeated game types, conditions, time periods, and settings 
(both in-person and online). Similar results are also observed in the behavior of Player 2 in a one-shot Trust 
Game, where reciprocating is never payoff-maximizing (unlike in repeated games). This indicates that the rela-
tionship we observe is driven by an actual social preference for reciprocity (e.g., the willingness to incur a cost to 
reciprocate70–72), rather than just strategic reasoning in repeated games. Finally, we provide evidence that decision 
conflict drives our effect: reciprocal decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and this lack of 
conflict explains a significant portion of the difference in decision times between reciprocal and non-reciprocal 
decisions.
Our results demonstrate the importance of considering social environment when examining decision time 
correlations, and may help to reconcile contradictory results from one-shot games. Expectations about inter-
action partners shape the relationship between decision time and cooperation. Hence, subjects’ beliefs about 
the likelihood of cooperation in one-shot games may produce positive, negative, or null correlations between 
decision time and cooperation. Consistent with this explanation, cooperation is typically faster than defec-
tion in one-shot game studies where most people cooperate (and therefore likely expected others to cooper-
ate22,24,27), whereas defection is typically faster than cooperation in studies where defection is more common than 
cooperation20,26.
Our Study 5 adds support to a recent and unorthodox (within the cooperation literature) claim regarding the 
interpretation of decision times30,46: whereas many assume that faster decisions are more intuitive, we provide 
evidence that instead faster decisions are less conflicted. It seems natural that reciprocal decisions involve less 
decision conflict, as reciprocity is typically long-run payoff maximizing. Importantly, while intuition/delibera-
tion and decision conflict have been shown to be dissociable processes30, the same logic that explains why rec-
iprocity is low conflict also suggests that reciprocity should be intuitive19. And indeed, behavioral experiments 
which manipulate the use of intuition versus deliberation show that intuition favors both positive and negative 
reciprocity73–76.
Theories of spillover effects in laboratory experiments (e.g., the Social Heuristics Hypothesis33,63,77,78) empha-
size that experiences from outside the lab influence subjects’ decisions and neurocognitive processes. The fact 
that, in the “unknown” environment, cooperation was faster than defection is consistent with the idea that daily 
experiences with norms and institutions initially led our American subjects to expect others to cooperate, and 
to be inclined towards cooperation themselves. However, once subjects engage in game play and learn about the 
behavior of their partners, they followed cues from the social environment. The initial expectation that others 
will cooperate comports well with, for example, evidence that American participants on Mturk tend to project 
a cooperative frame onto neutrally framed economic games79. It is also interesting to consider the connection 
between our results about baseline expectations and prior results suggesting that differences in baseline expecta-
tions about, and trust in, others influences participants’ intuitive default behaviors22,80,81.
Critically, our results are not consistent with the idea that simple imitation is what occurs quickly82. In par-
ticular, the interaction between social environment and the participant’s own move in the previous round (Fig. 2) 
highlights the role of reciprocal cooperation strategies, rather than simple imitation: imitation would lead to 
cooperation being faster than defection in a cooperative social environment (and defection being faster in a 
non-cooperative social environment) regardless of one’s previous move.
Our results also exclude the argument that faster responses are “error-prone”83, leading to a greater degree 
of mistakes in strategy implementation. On the contrary, we find that fast responses are further from random 
chance, and more in line with typically used (reciprocal) strategies: in cooperative social environments where 
most people cooperate, faster decisions are even more likely to be cooperative; and in non-cooperative environ-
ments, the opposite is true.
Although the experiments presented here involved humans making decisions in economic games played 
in the laboratory, our findings have implications beyond this setting. Firstly, there is substantial evidence that 
findings from laboratory games generalize to human behavior outside the lab84,85. Furthermore, decision speeds 
(often referred to as reaction times in the animal literature) are widely used in research on non-human animals, 
especially non-human primates, to make inferences about cognitive processes underlying decisions86–88, includ-
ing specifically in the context of prosociality89. Our findings suggest that decision speed studies in non-human 
animals should not neglect the importance of social environment, and should consider the role of decision con-
flict (rather than different forms of cognitive processing) in determining decision speeds.
Conclusion
Our results emphasize the centrality of reciprocity for human cooperation, and the importance of considering 
repeated games effects and associated variation in social environment when exploring the relationship between 
decision times and cooperation. Our results suggest that the speed of reciprocity is driven by (lack of) feelings of 
conflict (which is distinct from whether the actions are more intuitive versus deliberative30). Further specifying 
the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying quick reciprocal decisions is an important direction for future work; 
prior studies suggest the role of various brain areas for different types of reciprocal cooperation36,90–92. It would 
also be instructive to examine the role of social environment in the inferences people drawn based on others’ 
decision times93–96, and to explore whether the findings in the present study are observed in other primates97, in 
human children98,99, and in humans with a neurodevelopmental disorder such as autism100. When people are free 
to do as they choose, the thing they do most quickly is to reciprocate the behavior of others.
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